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It is a great honour to have my book featured by the European Hobbes Society, and to have 
Alissa MacMillan, Chris Holman, and Justin Steinberg give such detailed attention to the 
book's ideas and arguments. 
 
Potentia aspires to make contributions both to studies of Hobbes and Spinoza, and to 
democratic theory. I hope to have achieved philosophical and philological rigour in my 
readings of Hobbes's and Spinoza's texts. At the same time, my purpose in those readings is 
to locate ideas which might help reorient us with respect to contemporary systematic 
questions of political philosophy. I thank my critics for pressing on both of these fronts. I'll 
respond to four areas of concern that they raise: (i) Hobbes on power; (ii) Hobbes on 
democracy; (iii) the Hobbes/Spinoza relation; and (iv) the larger lessons for democratic 
theory.1 
 
i. Hobbes on power 
My interpretation of Hobbes centres on identifying a shift in his conception of human power, 
both individual and collective, between his early and late political texts. I draw significant 
political consequences from this shift. I would like to thank MacMillan for her efforts to 
reconstitute and situate this shift in terms of debates regarding the Hobbesian individual. Her 
presentation conveys some of the excitement that I myself felt in carrying out this research, 
excitement which I feared may have been lost in all the finer scholarly details of the chapters. 
Equally, however, I would like to thank Steinberg for asking whether I have overstated the 
shift's political consequences.2 In particular, Steinberg expresses skepticism that the changing 
conception of power explains (a) why Hobbes abandons De Cive's 'sleeping sovereign' in 
Leviathan, or (b) why in his early works Hobbes underestimates the threat of informal 
collectivities to sovereign power. I'll address these two challenges in turn. 
 
Steinberg reconstitutes my argument against the sleeping sovereign as follows. The sleeping 
sovereign does not actively exercise its power most of the time. But the later text Leviathan 
conceives power (potentia) as efficacy. An inactive power is ineffective, and as such, it is no 
power at all. So, the sleeping sovereign lacks power and is not viable as a sovereign. 
 
To this argument, Steinberg objects that nothing about efficacy requires continual action. 
Even once we clear out any residual scholastic commitment to inner essential tendencies, 
there must be a way of talking about everyday tendencies or dispositions or inactive powers. 
For instance, surely we can say that a driver has the power to brake even when they don't 
exercise that power. Just like the driver ready to brake, surely a sleeping sovereign could be 
ready to issue directives. Inactivity does not mean lack of power. 
 
In response, I grant that it is possible for Hobbes, in his later non-scholastic conception of 
power, to speak of dispositions and inactive powers. But under what conditions? For Hobbes, 
everything has its determinate causes, and possibility relates only to our epistemic 
limitations. Thus, to say that something is possible is just to say that, for all we know, it may 
happen in future. Correspondingly, we can attribute powers (potentiae) or dispositions only 
to the extent that we anticipate likely future efficacy, as for instance in the case of the car 
driver's power to brake.3 
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Nonetheless, I would suggest that this very standard of likely future efficacy raises problems 
for the putative power (potentia) of a sleeping sovereign that it does not raise for the driver's 
power to brake. Recall what is at stake: a government covers quotidian administration and 
governance, but from time to time the sleeping sovereign wakes, holding the government to 
account or redirecting its work through a vote. The sleeping sovereign, qua sovereign (summa 
potestas), holds the entitlement to everyone's obedience. Imagine the sovereign makes a 
ruling which is not to the pleasure of the government. How can it be confident of achieving 
the concrete obedience of the populace? Hobbes's answer in his early texts is simple: the 
sovereign is entitled to obedience, and the sovereign will get that obedience, because it holds 
the sword. But what is this 'sword', how is it constituted? Let us consider this power, not as a 
matter of entitlement, but as a question of concrete efficacy. It is composed out of the actions 
of individuals in society, which in turn are shaped by the everyday incentives and pressures 
that they face within ongoing relationships. And here lies the problem: subjects' everyday 
actions follow patterns of obedience to the government. If some portion of the government 
and/or the populace choose to not to comply with the sovereign, they have the ready network 
of collective power to do so. We end up with divided allegiance and risk of war, and a serious 
question mark over the likely future efficacy (and hence power) of the sovereign. Under an 
alternative scenario, the sleeping sovereign, aware of this risk, might take a strategy of 
appeasement: taking care not to ask controversial questions or allow controversial responses. 
On this scenario, a sleeping sovereign may avert the risk of civil war, but the scenario is 
hardly more encouraging for the idea that the sleeping sovereign is the true seat of power.4 
 
Let me turn now to the second respect in which Steinberg is skeptical about the political 
impact of Hobbes's changing philosophical conception of power: concerning the political 
salience of informal groupings. Steinberg reconstitutes my argument as follows. On Hobbes's 
early view, power potentia is conceived in a scholastic manner as grounded in essences, and 
only genuine individuals–not mere aggregates–can bear essences. This means that informal 
groupings, lacking potestas and formal structure, cannot bear essences or have power. This in 
turn leads Hobbes to underestimate their capacity to destabilize the sovereign. 
 
To this argument, Steinberg objects that Hobbes is in fact critical of essences. For instance, 
Hobbes's early discussion of human nature as a sum of various powers amounts to an 
antischolastic and antiessentialising reduction of the concept of human nature. So, even for 
early Hobbes, 'we don't need a theory of essences and their bearers in order to determine what 
sorts of things have powers'. 
 
In response, I concede that Hobbes is attempting an antischolastic polemic on multiple 
conceptual fronts, right from his early works. But my point is that, regardless of the vigour 
with which Hobbes may depart from scholasticism in many respects, there are conceptual 
features remaining in his early view of powers which are illuminatingly viewed as scholastic 
legacies. For Hobbes in his early works, collective power (potestas) is conceived of as the 
sum of the powers (potentiae) of the individual members of the collective, the full use of 
which the collective is entitled by (actual or rationally imputed) contract; the power potentia 
of the collective is equated to its potestas. Correspondingly, in these early works, Hobbes 
vigorously refuses to attribute to informal collectivities any power (certainly not potestas, but 
also not potentia) of their own.5 To me, this seems to show, contra Steinberg, that Hobbes 
does in fact 'rely on a theory of essences and their bearers in order to determine what sorts of 
things have power.' It is this reliance that (I argue) contributes to Hobbes's early blind spot 
about the threat of informal collectivities. To be sure, Hobbes is aware and concerned about 
the threat of insurrection throughout his entire oeuvre. But it is striking to me that Hobbes, in 
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his early works, attempts to conceive seditious groupings as illicit formal collectivities, 
leading (I argue) to a straitened and inadequate grasp of the dynamics of popular unrest.6 
 
ii. Hobbes on Democracy 
Following its analysis of Hobbesian concepts of power, Potentia articulates a certain 
understanding of Hobbesian democracy. As already discussed above, I think that the 'sleeping 
sovereign' model of democracy is deeply flawed, and that it is Hobbes's own recognition of 
these flaws that leads him to abandon the model in his later writings. In its place, I offer my 
model of 'repressive egalitarianism', which draws both on my own conceptual and exegetical 
analyses of power in Hobbes's later writings, and also on more historically informed studies 
of Collins and Zagorin. According to this model, the key to democratic sovereignty is 
maximal suppression of sub-state power blocs, such that individuals are rendered equal in 
power to one another, and unable to band together to disrupt the sovereign democratic 
decision.7 To be clear, in my discussions of repressive egalitarianism, it is not my purpose to 
defend repressive egalitarianism as an optimal model of popular power, but merely to defend 
the exegetical claim that it is Hobbes's model. In the arc of the book's argument, the value in 
Hobbesian repressive egalitarianism is its withering intolerance towards the oligarchic 
informal forces in the social body which so often masquerade as bearers of popular power. 
For now, I'll consider three objections to my interpretation of Hobbes on democracy, two 
from Holman and one from MacMillan. 
 
Holman's first objection is that repressive egalitarianism is far from the most interesting or 
salient model of democracy that we might glean from Hobbes's texts. My model of repressive 
egalitarianism appears implicitly committed to electoral democracy. But in Holman's view, 
Hobbes's model of democracy is neither plebiscitary (as per Tuck), nor 
electoral/representative, but direct participatory democracy. Holman constructs this 
Rousseauvian reading of Hobbes by drawing on De Cive's definition of democracy as an 
assembly of all citizens.8 On Holman's reading, this democracy requires 'concrete 
institutional spaces' for shared deliberation that are 'universally accessible and must meet at 
determinate–as opposed to merely occasional–times and places'. In this light, my book should 
be faulted for missing what is both the true Hobbesian model of democracy, and also a more 
useful model for us today, instead wilfully promoting a less meaningfully democratic model. 
 
For now, my response will focus on Holman's claims regarding Hobbes's texts, leaving the 
contemporary application to be considered in my following section. I confess I am skeptical 
regarding the Hobbesian credentials of Holman's model. Within De Cive, a democratic 
assembly, an assembly of all citizens, is an assembly in which 'everyone has a right' to vote 
and participate in debates. But there is no indication that he views a small (relative to 
population) assembly like a parliament as being in principle disqualified from meeting this 
requirement. Indeed, as sovereignty is vested in a single assembly, actual participation must 
be limited to a small number by logistical necessity. Certainly, as Holman points out, Hobbes 
argues that England of the Rump Parliament was an oligarchy and not a democracy. But what 
makes this the case is not (contra Holman) the general fact that parliaments are relatively 
small and inaccessible bodies, but the much more specific fact that this parliament had 
permanently and formally excluded some people on the basis of their political views (in the 
course of the 1648-9 transition between Long and Rump Parliaments).9 
 
If I am right, De Cive offers a model of democracy which is content with only very limited 
actual participation. Holman and Tuck both, in different ways, try to resist this conclusion, 
and Holman's proposal strikes me as just as creative as Tuck's. Tuck's plebiscitary democratic 
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sovereignty achieves universality by dropping the requirement for holding an actual 
assembly. Holman's alternative envisages multiple deliberative assemblies jointly covering 
the entire commonwealth. But in its creativity, Holman's proposal seems to me to stray 
further away from anything Hobbes could endorse: for what better way to commit the 
cardinal Hobbesian sin of inviting conflict through ambiguity of authority than by 
sanctioning multiple mutually insubordinate regional assemblies. 
 
In my account of Hobbes's late models of political order, repressive egalitarianism is a 
general feature of all forms of sovereignty. Whether democracy, aristocracy, or monarchy, 
the important thing is that there should be as little as possible by way of counter-powers 
which could challenge sovereign commands. Rather, the commonwealth should aggregate 
isolated individuals who have little choice but compliance with sovereign command. But 
repressive egalitarianism would take a particular manifestation in democratic orders. One key 
risk to be addressed is that democratic assemblies themselves might be sites for the formation 
of informal oligarchic powerblocs and oligarchic allegiance. I argue that Hobbes's analysis of 
counsel shows a simultaneous commitment to widespread consultation across the whole 
population along with a strong hostility to collective deliberation within political assembly 
(especially democratic assembly).10 
 
Holman's second objection is that I have underplayed Hobbes's account of the possibilities of 
non-antagonistic sociality, found for instance in Leviathan Chapter 22's discussion of 
collective activities. In response, I grant that my presentation has focussed more heavily on 
informal oligarchic power blocs, such as may accumulate around rich or charismatic figures. 
These are not antagonistic–their complex structure eludes any simple binary of horizontal 
mutual association versus vertical domination–but nor are they very appealing. I focus on 
these because they are (I argue) both underrecognized in the literature, and of great 
systematic importance in understanding Hobbes's later political philosophy. 
 
Despite this focus, I do not mean to deny that Hobbes grants there can also be more 
productive and collaborative sociality. But to me, the key questions are, what are the concrete 
conditions under which such sociality arises and is sustained? and what is its relation to 
politics? Answering these questions reveals that in Hobbes's philosophy, the human 
possibility of productive sociality can neither serve as a model nor as a foundation for 
democratic politics. In Leviathan's Chapter 22, on 'systemes', Holman's exemplars of sociable 
association occur within, and presuppose, the security provided by sovereign rule. As such, 
they cannot serve as a model for that rule. Furthermore, I don't see in Hobbes any trace of the 
idea that these associations could, even when internally sociable, play a useful role in shaping 
or constraining sovereign power. (That idea, which I endorse, I associate with Spinoza, not 
Hobbes.11) To the contrary, on my reading, all associations constitute threats to sovereign 
rule, because they constitute points of incipient resistance to that rule. In laying out idea of 
'repressive egalitarianism', my point is to trace as best I can Hobbes's own late account of the 
conditions of possibility of overcoming the political problem, which is to constitute a unified 
commonwealth without internal power blocs. As it is impossible to eliminate internal power 
blocs entirely, I read Chapter 22 as an attempt to taxonomize and triage the threat posed by 
those groupings that remain. 
 
Now I turn to MacMillan, who objects that I soft-pedal the educational dimension of both 
Hobbes's and Spinoza's political philosophies. MacMillan suggests that repressive 
egalitarianism is achieved through rational education, and not through any 'strange and 
impossible engineering of individuals'. Drawing on Pettit's work, she suggests that subjects 
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can come to internalize and act upon their duty in good part through achieving a true 
understanding of grounds of politics, and not merely through indoctrination. 
 
In response, the book does attempt a discussion of Hobbes's views on education. But perhaps 
this is unsatisfying to MacMillan, because the upshot of that discussion is a fairly deep 
ambivalence regarding the promise of education to solve the political problem. In Hobbes's 
early works, I argue that neither education nor indoctrination are particularly important. For 
he is confident peace can be secured simply by establishing the appropriate juridical regime 
of rights, with subjects' compliance achieved by the threat of the sovereign's sword, not by 
their understanding.12 In the later works, Hobbes is more attentive to the insufficiency of the 
threat of punishment to shape behaviour, leading to a much greater interest in persuading and 
teaching people how they ought to behave.13 But on my interpretation, the real underlying 
problem is that subjects can have hope of success in resisting sovereign commands, if they 
ally themselves with informal oligarchic power blocs beneath the sovereign. Hobbesian 
repressive egalitarianism seeks to break up or constrain potential counterpowers in the social 
body. For Hobbes, intellectual strategies of education or indoctrination, while not without 
some value, cannot succeed unless they are paired with this more structural approach to 
political stability.14 
 
iii.  The Hobbes/Spinoza Relation 
One ambition of the book is to reconfigure our understanding of the relation between the 
political philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza, which I think has been greatly muddied by the 
absence of a clear account of their various conceptions of power. Potentia claims to establish 
a reading which shows their political philosophies have more in common than usually 
recognized. In particular, I draw out the similarities between (late) Hobbesian potentia and 
Spinoza's potentia operandi, and their shared focus on the concrete conditions the durability 
of the state. 
 
Steinberg raises the concern that I have overdrawn the similarities between the two thinkers, 
and unduly minimized breaks of real significance between them. Specifically, even if we 
grant the similarity between late Hobbes's potentia and Spinoza's potentia operandi, they 
'each have an additional conception of power that the other would have rejected (or did 
reject)'. First, Spinoza rejects appeals to de jure authority and obligation, whereas such 
concepts are the foundation of Hobbesian philosophy. Second, Hobbes offers no counterpart 
to the Spinozist potentia agendi, power of producing effects understood through the thing's 
own nature alone. 
  
In response, I very much like Steinberg's neat characterization of what I concede is a deep 
difference between the thinkers. Nonetheless, I wonder whether that deep difference needs 
somehow to be accommodated more in the book than it already is, given the book's goals. 
 
The observation that Hobbes has a strongly juridical conception of power, and that Spinoza 
critiques Hobbes for this conception, is central to the book. A major challenge for the book is 
to determine what this difference amounts to. The view that a Spinozist attention to the 
question of potentia as efficacy is sufficient to undermine Hobbes's supposedly hard-headed 
civil science is a staple of the literature. According to this view (encouraged by Spinoza's 
own Letter 50 and by Chapter 17 of his Theological-Political Treatise), Hobbes's juridical 
focus on questions of right and authority comes at the expense of any serious consideration of 
the concrete grounds of exercise of this right. But in fact (still according to this view), 
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Hobbesian absolute sovereignty cannot achieve requisite potentia to match its authority. Thus  
Hobbes's political philosophy is a failure.15 
 
The first half of the book strives to show that this view is false. I show that Hobbes in his 
later works very clearly does have an account of the potentia requisite to sovereign potestas. 
In particular, adequate potentia can be achieved in the regime, so ambivalent to contemporary 
sensibilities, that I have characterized as 'repressive egalitarian'. In reconstructing the late 
Hobbesian theory of potentia, and giving it such relative prominence in the book, I am 
fighting against a tide of literature which (from the Hobbes side) pays too little attention to 
Hobbes's nonjuridical analysis of power, and which (correspondingly, from the Spinoza side) 
critiques Hobbes for his neglect of such an analysis. 
 
Thus, despite the book's focus on Hobbes's potentia, in no way to I mean thereby to deny the 
obvious fact that that Hobbes is overwhelmingly, from start to finish, a juridical thinker of 
power, focussed on questions of right and potestas. At the same time, I confess I am rather 
more interested in Hobbes's concrete theory of power than in his juridical theory. I agree with 
Hoekstra's suggestion that juridically conceived absolute sovereignty ultimately 'becomes a 
kind of hidden God, largely irrelevant to our ongoing thinking about politics'.16 And if the 
goal is obtaining a solid grasp of concrete political power and its possible configurations, 
Spinoza's own picture is sometimes naive and simplistic (notably the Theological-Political 
Treatise's discussions of democracy, Chapters 5 and 16). On this point, our understanding is 
richly enhanced by Hobbes's theory of potentia. 
 
I turn now to consider Spinoza's potentia agendi. In his own work, Steinberg convincingly 
shows that the Spinozist goal of politics is freedom in metaphysical sense, that is, the 
increasing rational self-determination of citizens, understood in terms of an increase of their 
individual potentiae agendi. By contrast, Hobbes is remarkable amongst philosophers for his 
total lack of interest in specifying ethical virtues, or indeed in any ethical conception of 
happiness beyond political salience, and also for his vehemently antimetaphysical disinterest 
in question of natures. 
 
I already do recognize Spinoza's potentia agendi has some role in core political theses of the 
book which would not have been possible from Hobbes alone. I already grant that the model 
of popular power that I end up championing is neo-Spinozist insofar as it is interested in 
specifying a political order's own power (its potentia agendi), and not merely its efficacy.17 I 
also criticize Hobbes for his failure to consider that the seditious character of sub-state groups 
may be a product of certain conditions rather than a constant of human nature, and this failure 
on Hobbes's part is conceivably linked to his general lack of interest in philosophically 
investigating human nature.18 What more exactly, salient to the goals of the book, should I 
have acknowledged?19 
 
iv. Larger Lessons for Democratic Theory 
In this final section of reply, I address some concerns raised regarding Potentia's 
contributions to contemporary democratic theory. Holman and MacMillan both defend the 
honour of democratic radicalism and of grassroots power, which they suggest is insufficiently 
respected in my book. 
 
The question, 'what does popular power even mean?', can be met with two quite different 
kinds of answer. One kind of answer analyzes the conceptual structure of popular power. A 
different kind of answer specifies the implementation of power so conceived. Potentia is 
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primarily concerned to defend an answer of the first, conceptual, type. I propose to 
reconceive popular power, such that a political phenomenon counts as a manifestation of 
popular power when it is popular (it eliminates oligarchy and encompasses the whole polity) 
and powerful (it robustly determines political and social outcomes). Let me draw out two 
notable features of this conception. First, popular power is judged at the level of the overall 
functioning of society, rather than at the level of specific events, processes, or institutions. 
Second, popular power is judged at the level of durably achieved effects, not at the level of 
will or intention. If we want popular power worthy of the name, this is what I take it to 
consist in. If this conceptual move is granted, then the second type of question does become 
pressing: what specific political phenomena, events, and processes might tend to be found in 
a society meeting this standard of popular power? However, Potentia does not offer a fully 
formed answer to this second question, instead just offering some schematic suggestions.20 
 
Thus, it is a misconception that Potentia is importantly opposed to various democratic 
phenomena of a more radical flavour (plebiscites, social movements, or even participatory 
democracy); it is a misconception that I think it is a mistake for social movements, mass 
plebiscites, or other mass participation to be central to popular politics. The conceptual frame 
that I advance simply denies that any particular phenomenon, including plebiscites or social 
movements, is the definitive bearer or gauge of popular power. In principle, I am quite open 
about whether in fact society of popular power will feature extensive plebiscites and/or social 
movements. 
 
In fact, I am sympathetic to idea that some significant presence of social movements would 
be required for meaningful popular power to be achieved.21 As Machiavelli argues, peaceful 
republics tend to be aristocratic (like Venice); to achieve a less hierarchical polity, 
contentious politics is necessary (like the tumults of the Roman plebs).22 It is true that I am 
more skeptical about plebsicites: historical examples both from my native Australia and from 
my current residence of Singapore show how readily plebiscites can be engineered to serve 
purposes of authorities who establish them; in other cases, the results of vote have been 
captured by the deep pockets of partisan advertising.23 At the same time, sometimes 
plebiscites have been established in more meaningful ways. One of the better examples is the 
Irish Abortion Referendum. The Irish Citizen's Assembly looms large in the book because of 
its role in setting up that referendum, not because some such an assembly is necessarily the 
keystone of popular power.24 
 
So, with these general comments in place, let me turn my critics. MacMillan accepts my 
critique of any radical democratic appeal to a popular power standing outside the processes of 
social formation. But in her critical comments, she suggests that I go too far in the 
institutional direction. In the web of mutual causation between institutions and the individuals 
who interact with them, if it's a choice where to locate popular power, MacMillan interprets 
my book as identifying popular power on the side of the institutions. On her reading, I grant 
that social movements have a causal impact on the institutions of popular power, but deny 
that these movements are themselves part of popular power. MacMillan proposes that we 
should resist this such a stark choice, and instead we should view popular power as a 
'symbiosis' between grassroots action and institutions. 
 
In response, the view I want to defend is in fact aligned rather closely with MacMillan's. 
Perhaps I introduced confusion by a carelessly equivocal use of the notion of 'institutional'. 
Sometimes the term contrasts with 'extrainstitutional' forces such as social movements and 
informal collective actions, but other times 'institutional' is understood more expansively, to 
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includes the full array of social practices and processes which together constitute the polity. 
On my view, popular power should be identified at the second, broader, level, and this sounds 
very much like MacMillan's 'symbiosis'. 
 
Now I turn to Holman's comments on the book's contemporary claims. Holman agrees that it 
is not worth defending a radical democracy founded (as per Tuck and Negri) on the 
unmediated will of the people. But in Holman's view, I am too quick to offer parliamentary 
democracy as alternative. Instead, Holman defends another radical tradition, for which the 
core commitment is a critique of the elitism of representative democracy. 
 
In response, I am happy to acknowledge the countless perversities of representative 
democracy, not merely its aristocratic/oligarchic tendencies, but also its systematic distortion 
by electoral objectives.25 At the same time, I wonder whether there remains a role for 
representative systems, to help balance out some potential hidden exclusions and difficulties 
that face strong interpretations of direct participatory democracy. For instance, the extreme 
time-poverty of carers constitutes an obstacle to their participation in formally open 
participatory assemblies. For another example, a privilege to the autonomy of local 
participatory assembles can provide cover for antidistributive policies between rich and poor 
regions. 
 
Again, most important to Potentia is the conceptual criterion of popular power. My point is 
not to be either for or against particular practices or institutions, such as electoral versus 
participatory democracy. What needs to be identified is the combination of elements which 
best achieves a society of equality and participation over time. In my own sketch, I imagine 
many factors interacting with and counteracting electoral politics: a mix of participatory fora, 
lottocracy, social movements, as well as expert bodies. But if an overall political order which 
eliminates electoral representation and replaces it with extensive participatory democracy in 
fact meets the standards of popular power that I have described, I am happy to endorse it. 
 
However, I recognize that my conceptual claim is controversial. In particular, I suspect that 
Holman may not grant it. Holman's own discussion of democracy, both in this review and in 
his other work, appears to identify popular power with a specific political location–namely, a 
network of participatory deliberative fora–and not at the level of overall social effects. This 
feature of Holman's scholarship helps to make vivid the hard choice that lies at the 
foundation of Potentia's engagement with democratic theory. The book starts by facing up to 
the disappointments that afflict all particular institutions and sites of democracy–not merely 
electoral democracy but equally plebiscites and mass movements, and also even participatory 
democracy. From time to time, in greater or lesser degree, these institutions and sites all find 
themselves going wrong. They may be captured by moneyed interests, eroded by zerosum 
conflict, confidently tyrannizing their internal minorities, wracked by an inability translate 
ideas into durable outcomes. In light of these disappointments, what should we think of 
popular power and democracy? Holman's response is that popular power is highly ambivalent 
and can be self-destructive: that's just the tragedy of democracy. The response of my book is 
different. Rather than hold onto a tragic vision of democracy, and correspondingly oscillate 
between hope and despair about its value, instead Potentia proposes the very meaning of 
popular power needs to be rethought. On this new conceptualization, a self-destructive, 
oligarchic, or otherwise failing democracy is not an case of misused popular power. Rather, it 
is a case where popular power worthy of the name has not yet been achieved. 
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